and inheritances in jeopardy. No ordinary considerations could justify a legislature in giving the sanction of law to such a violation.

But does that necessity exist in this case? Can it exist, when a structure which involves none of these risks, and none of these certain or contingent evils, can be built for a sum utterly insignificant in comparison with the value of the injury apprehended from the work proposed?

It is vain to urge the necessity of the measure on the ground of the impracticability of the alternative plan—a high bridge at the Narrows. Its practicability can be established by its achievement long before the railway will be in a condition to use the work.

It cannot be, then, on the basis of public necessity, or public convenience, that this new road will be permitted to impede the most important entrance into your prosperous city, or to stop up the principal avenue of your commerce and thrift.

The necessity does not exist, and the superior convenience is attained by adopting a high level, which leaves the navigation open. There is no motive here, founded on public utility, or defended by the public interest, which can sanction the placing of any impediment in the channel of this stream. And it is not to be supposed, therefore, that the Legislature, under such circumstances, will consent to relieve this Company, important as its intentions may be to the general welfare, from a trifling outlay, at the expense of Hartford—sacrificing existing vested rights of known and