THE ENOLA GAY EXHIBIT:
A CASE STUDY IN CONTROVERSY

Moderator: Preble Stolz, Professor Emeritus, University of California School of Law, Berkeley
Speakers: Thomas J. Crouch, Chairman, Aeronautics Department, National Air and Space
Museum, Washington, D.C.
Daniel Martinez, Park Historian, USS Arizona Memorial, National Park Service
John Shy, Professor of History, University of Michigan
Herman S. Wolk, Senior Historian, Air Force History Support Office, Headquarters, United States
Air Force

SUMMARY OF REMARKS BY PREBLE STOLZ

Preble Stolz explained the purpose of the panel, to discuss the controversy surrounding the Enola
Gay exhibition, and introduced the panelists.

SUMMARY OF REMARKS BY THOMAS J. CROUCH

As the supervisor of the curators who prepared the original script for the B-29 Enola Gay exhibit,
Thomas J. Crouch explained that he would recapitulate the events that became surrounded with
controversy. He noted that critics have questioned the very premise of the exhibit itself. “Why
not,” they asked, “simply exhibit the airplane with a label and handful of photographs?” Crouch
explained that “we display some of the most significant items in our collection in precisely that
way. It is an effective technique for inspiring a sense of awe and wonder in museum visitors. But
we believe the museum should also at least occasionally help visitors understand the complex
background of aerospace development and its impact on the world.”

For that reason “we set out to tell the story of the airplane and the bombs it carried in as full,
honest, and balanced a fashion as we could. We sought to explain a moment in time that was a
turning point in the history of the world.” The first draft of the script, completed in January 1994,
was 500 pages long and contained five units discussing the Pacific War in 1944 and 1945, the
decisions relating to the bomb, the B-29 and the atomic missions, the destruction on the ground,
and the impact of those events on the next fifty years of our history.” The script was an “imperfect
vessel. It was short on context, though not as short as some of our critics suggested.” Still, Crouch
admits the museum should have provided fuller coverage of the roots and early phases of the
struggle to defeat Japanese militarism.

Misquotations exacerbated the problems. A national magazine quoted the script as follows; “It
was a U.S. war of vengeance against a nation attempting to preserve its unique culture.” The
actual quotation reads, “For most Americans this war was fundamentally different that the one
waged against Germany and Italy. It was a war of vengeance. For most Japanese it was a war to
defend their unique culture.” Crouch then asked if anyone really doubted that Americans were
determined to avenge Pearl Harbor and the Bataan Death March, or that most Japanese did see
themselves as defending their culture. Those sentences appeared on a label calling attention to
“the naked aggression and extreme brutality of Japanese aggression.” Still, the sentences were
“clumsy,” and the museum removed them after the first review. One year and six revised scripts
later the media continues to misquote the two sentences, Crouch said.
The script was subject to a revision process that began with a strong advisory committee that included Richard Rhodes, Barton Bernstein, Marty Sherwin, Stan Goldberg, and other leaders in the field, to ensure a variety of points. Richard Hallion, chief historian of the Air Force, and his deputy, Herman Wolk; Ed Bearss, a military historian, a wounded Pacific war veteran, and chief historian of the National Park Service; and Ed Linenthal, who had worked with the National Park Service, the Holocaust Museum, and other organizations, assisted.

The group offered useful suggestions for improving the draft script and was generous in its praise of the document. After the controversy had begun, Harvard University professor Akira Iriye, ex-president of the American Historical Association, wrote in a letter that, “the script as originally drafted was an excellent one, reflecting current historical scholarship.” Many other scholars who were not initially involved in the project have also expressed their support for the original document since that time.

However, the applause was far from universal. As early as November 1993 leaders of the Air Force Association registered strong opposition to a draft proposal describing the exhibition. The group received a copy of the script when it went to the advisory committee, along with a request for comment and an invitation to participate in the revision process. The association replied in April 1994 with the first of several critical articles published in Air Force magazine. The museum then turned to the Pentagon-based World War II Commemorative Committee, which assisted the museum in obtaining advice and comment from another group of historians employed by the military services. “They helped us identify problem areas in the script and to wrestle with questions of balance,” Crouch recalled. In addition, museum director Martin Harwitt created a Tiger Team, that included critics of the exhibition, to identify imbalances in the script.

A new script issued in June 1994 incorporated many of the changes these groups suggested. Crouch said, “By September we had met 88 percent of the Tiger Team recommendations, either wholly or in part.” The new script, however, did not placate the most vocal critics. From midsummer to the end of the year, continued negotiations with the Air Force Association and leading U.S. veterans organizations led to a steady stream of additional changes. Yet public outrage, fed by an avalanche of media criticism, reached a “fever pitch.” Members of Congress expressed dissatisfaction and counterprotests arose among scholarly groups and peace activists. The Smithsonian’s effort to regain control of the situation, and with it the exhibition as it had been planned, collapsed in January 1995.

What went wrong with the Enola Gay exhibit? Why did a script regarded as fair and accurate by authorities in the field become the subject of such controversy? Crouch believes part of the problem lies in the fact that “at the Air and Space Museum we behaved as though there was only one question to be answered: Is this script an accurate telling of this story? We did not pause to ask a second question: Are factors at work that might make an honest and accurate account of the events unacceptable to museum stakeholders or the public?”

Many thought the exhibition violated what Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor John Dower refers to as “the heroic narrative,” Crouch explained, which casts a story in “completely positive terms with little nuance or ambiguity.” Dower identifies the museum’s approach as a “tragic narrative” that “embraces ambiguity and a good part of the heroic narrative as well, without denying the bravery of individual American fighting men or the worthiness of the war against the Japanese.” Crouch said the exhibition never intended to attack the justification for the use of the bomb, although it acknowledged that the decision has been “the subject of considerable study and analysis over the last half century.” For many, that was enough to suggest the museum was questioning “an article of national faith.”
“We did not sufficiently appreciate the depth and power of the emotional link that binds the memory of the bomb to the joy and relief at the end of the war,” Crouch said. He concluded that the museum “hoped to create a thoughtful exhibition that would tell the whole story of a major turning point in our history within a rich, full context. We thought anything less would be irresponsible. Our critics judged that attempt to be irresponsible. At the very least, we were guilty of failing to understand the depth and intensity of American attitudes toward Hiroshima and Nagasaki.”

SUMMARY OF REMARKS BY HERMAN S. WOLK

Based on the events of the last sixteen months, Herman S. Wolk’s view is that the script for the Enola Gay exhibit failed on three levels: those of substance, process, and structure. “The initial scripts were neither balanced, fair, nor in proper context. The holocaust perpetrated by an aggressive, imperial Japanese military in East Asia from 1931 to 1945 was glossed over,” he asserted, adding that the United States Air Force never had any objection to the Ground Zero section of the script.

Wolk recalled that he and Dick Hallion requested a meeting with Air and Space Museum director Martin Harwitt and the curators in January 1994 before seeing the first script. Wolk’s impression from this meeting and the initial scripts, was that an agenda was being articulated—“specifically that the unconditional surrender policy had been wrong, that a demonstration of the atomic bomb should have been conducted, that the bomb should not have been dropped, and that it was dropped to impress the Soviet Union or because of the heavy investment in the Manhattan Project—and that the American strategic-bombing campaign was the villain of the script.” Wolk concedes it was proper to raise these issues, but the sheer repetition of them suggested an agenda. “It was a question, in part, of preponderance,” he explained.

Wolk suggested that another troubling lack of context concerned the evolution of American strategic bombing policy. President Franklin Roosevelt, as Commander in Chief, was the leading advocate of strategic bombing. Wolk observed that “the American operational air commanders in the Pacific had carte blanche” from President Roosevelt and President Truman “to do everything possible to end the war as quickly as possible with the least loss of American lives.”

According to Wolk, the first script was an admirable job of primary and secondary research. However, it contained “serious failures in balance and context.” These problems point to serious flaws in the Air and Space Museum’s internal review and response processes. “There was a clear lack of internal, rigorous review.”

After the barrage of criticism directed at the first script, Harwitt sent a memo to the curators on April 16, 1994, instructing them to remedy this lack of balance and context, Wolk continued. On August 23, he received a call from Harwitt, who admitted little had been done. Then, a script arrived with a cover letter that said, “This script must be considered final.” Wolk called Thomas Crouch, who replied that he did indeed want comments from the Air Force. By the summer of 1994, Wolk recalled, “in my mind, nonresponse on the museum’s part had become an ethical and professional issue. We were reviewing these scripts in a serious manner and receiving no response.” When the museum did respond, it was, in Wolk’s words, “too late” and the “structural content suffered.”

In his opinion, the dichotomy between history and memory, or between veterans and historians, is a “false dichotomy. History and memory equals good history.” Instead of focusing on this distinction, Wolk suggested historians and curators examine the balance between artifacts and
ideology to provide the exhibition viewer a better understanding of what happened. "The people who structure exhibits," he observed, "need to understand the context of the times." In his view, there was never a doubt that veterans could stand analysis; "it was that they objected to bad analysis that lacked context."

"These shortcomings of substance, process, and structure are correctable if recognized and acted upon," he concluded. Wolk called for a mandatory "intense, rigorous internal review process. The museum requires a more serious, rapid, and comprehensive reaction to recommendations and criticism. The Smithsonian is a national treasure and a public trust. I see no valid reason why controversial exhibitions cannot be mounted that emphasize the contexts of the time and that give short shrift to lecturing the public. I am confident this conference will succeed in charting a pathway to mounting controversial exhibits. The American people deserve no less."

SUMMARY OF REMARKS BY DANIEL MARTINEZ

"This matter of controversy is extremely serious." Daniel Martinez began. "It is like a rock thrown into a still lake on a summer day and we have yet to see where the waves will touch." His colleagues in the museum community and throughout the National Park Service (NPS) have "felt the sting" of what occurred at the National Air and Space Museum. Martinez's experience at the Little Big Horn National Battlefield and Monument, formerly the Custer Battlefield National Monument, taught him to work carefully with all constituents and not to alienate them. He recalled a controversy about a false report that the Japanese midget submarine, the HA-19, was to be moved to the USS Arizona Memorial. It was contained, largely due to the insights of an experienced public relations officer.

Martinez then turned to a citation of a personal philosophy exemplified in the book by Dr. Edward Linenthal, Sacred Ground: Americans and their Battlefields.

As a historian, part of my obligation is to attend to the voice of veterans, those who speak out on the event, who help us touch the reality in ways that no one else can. I have listened carefully to Pearl Harbor veterans and Holocaust survivors speak, and with that privileged voice of being witness, they have a sacred duty to help us approach the event through their testimony and their times, when we must out of common decency and awe in the face of unspeakable horror simply remain silent. Another part of my obligation is to speak with my own voice, the voice of the historian, the only voice with which I can demonstrate my commitment to remembrance. There is occasionally some tension between the commemorative voice and the historical voice. The commemorative voice is a personal and intimate voice. It is the voice that we should honor above all today. The historical voice is impersonal and studious. It seeks to discern motivations and understand actions and discuss consequences that were impossible to analyze during the event itself. It is a voice that some can feel condescending even when there is no condescension intended. It can feel detached, and even when those who speak out of this voice try to connect with them, the tension between the commemorative and the historical voice is present, as well as the simmering issue on how the Smithsonian Institution should present the Enola Gay.

In 1991, it became increasingly evident to Martinez that the fiftieth anniversary of the Pearl Harbor bombing was not going to be "a conciliatory event." The World War II Commemorative Committee and the State Department regarded the American veteran as the focus of
commemoration, and "we moved and planned to accommodate that," Martinez explained. There were efforts, however, to plan a few symbolic conciliatory programs, but these were met with opposition. A patriotic program featuring veterans was met with approval by veterans' groups, but a "reconciliation event," in which schoolchildren from the fifty states were to join fifty Japanese children in a procession to the shoreline of Pearl Harbor to drop flowers to honor the dead of Pearl Harbor, was deemed inappropriate and canceled. It became evident that in the same nation there were "different dreams."

From early on, the NPS public affairs staff was involved in the planning of all NPS commemorative programs. By mid 1991, procedures assuring "process and focus" were in place for all exhibits and programs. Martinez explained how this process was used to produce a replacement for a much-complained-about Navy film. Reflecting visitors' concerns, several congressional complaints found it too soft on the Japanese and apologetic in nature. NPS thought the story was incomplete and, in some cases, used perjorative language. Martinez and USS Arizona Memorial curator Bob Chenworth consulted with representatives from several veterans' groups, from the Pearl Harbor Survivors, and NPS staff in the process of script revision and film acquisition. Throughout the twenty-six script revisions, the review process remained confidential, forestalling reactions to any crises that occurred.

According the Martinez, a critical mistake in the Enola Gay exhibition was failure to understand the audience who would visit and be affected by this monumental exhibit. A majority of the thousands of people who came to Hawaii in 1991 for the Pearl Harbor anniversary were veterans. Similarly, the veterans were the pulse that the Enola Gay exhibit was going to touch, and they would respond if they felt their honor was not being properly depicted. "I could see early on that the National Air and Space Museum was going to have a problem when the Air Force Association published its deeply indignant remarks about the script," Martinez recalled. The crescendo of public reaction to what the Air Force Association deemed unpatriotic and "revisionist" interpretation was predictable. "The horse was out of the barn and the press closed in."

The Smithsonian failed to recognize the sensitivity of interpreting World War II in the theater of commemoration. "There is a big difference between 1945 and 1995." Academic historians who were advisors and contributors to the script "failed to recognize the arena in which they had placed their interpretation." In addition, public affairs officers should have been involved from the beginning. The failure to identify one spokesman to respond to the questions of the public and media opened the gates of mixed signals and conflicting institutional positions. Key veterans' groups should have been identified from the beginning and their participation in the review process assured.

In conclusion, Martinez pointed to the gap between public and academic historians. Even "the academic language at some of these conferences is foreign to the public," Martinez declared, exemplifying the chasm. Academic historians live in a different world that allows open discussion and free thought. The public historian lives in a world where they must take into consideration the audience that visits them and the reaction that exhibits will cause. He believes that the future of museums must be the coordination of academic scholars and public historians in order for museums to function on both a scholarly and public level. This partnership is essential if we are to avoid the type of controversy that now surrounds the Enola Gay exhibit.

SUMMARY OF REMARKS BY JOHN SHY

John Shy, who has been teaching military history for almost forty years, began by reminding participants, "War is truly terrible." Still, "war books, films, and games represent war as gigantic fun, like a sports event with very high stakes and the whole world as spectators." The reality of
war, however, is "death, pain, loss, and suffering on a huge scale, things that endure long after the last shot is fired." Nations who wage war must take responsibility for their collective actions, and "in a democratic nation we all share responsibility," Shy continued. "Without this shared responsibility, war would be nothing but mass murder. As a nation we have to answer when asked to justify the human cost of war. Americans have been fervent in their conviction that World War II was a just war and that we fought it responsibly. It is our obligation to honor Americans who gave or risked their lives in the war, but it is neither moral nor logical to forget the thousands who suffered by our acts in the violent struggle," he contended.

Shy believes that memory is at the center of human existence, and that reflecting on experience is at the core of "humanity and identity. "We can act rationally and responsibly only by remembering, and honest remembering is often difficult, painful, and complicated." However, honest remembering is crucial to our health as individuals as well as a nation. "No one owns the national memory," Shy declared, "not curators and historians, not elected or appointed officials, and not organized veterans."

For these reasons, "commemorations of past wars will always walk a narrow line between our responsibility as a nation for our wartime acts and our equally demanding obligations as human beings who know that killing is wrong," Shy stated. He admitted that when he read both the original Smithsonian script and the October revision, he saw nothing wrong. "Maybe that is my problem," he acknowledged. "But to decide that the commemoration of the Enola Gay mission should have been kept strictly separate from any serious remembering of what actually happened in August 1945 was at best mistaken." In his view, remembering the wartime past accurately and honestly does not dishonor veterans. "In remembering any war it is simply wrong to exclude from memory those people we categorized fifty years ago as wartime enemies. To do so is a collective fantasy. It is dangerous to our national health."

SUMMARY OF GROUP DISCUSSION

"The horror of World War II is well painted by John Shy," remarked Herman S. Wolk. "People all over the world suffered, and I hope we learned some lessons from that." In response to Wolk's criticisms of the Air and Space Museum's internal processes, Thomas J. Crouch said, "I think you can pick problems in the process—you are right about that—but I do not think timely responsiveness was one of the problems." Wolk replied, "It did not seem that way from where we were sitting, Tom."

"Tom and Herman are two people who had the misfortune to get caught in the machinery," John Shy observed, "and Dan is someone who has the good fortune and skill to learn how to work that machinery very well without getting caught in it. I could put myself in any of your three places readily."

Daniel Martinez recounted the experience of a five-day symposium that was part of the Pearl Harbor fiftieth anniversary. Almost all parties who were primary to the Pearl Harbor attack were involved. The National Park Service had received an edict that no other nation would be involved in the anniversary, but seven Japanese guests had been invited to the symposium. Martinez agreed to the recommendation of the public affairs officer that the symposium be delayed until after the actual anniversary. By December 7, nearly everyone was gone except the 700 people who were interested in attending the symposium. At the end, the choir sang an old Civil War song, "Tenting on the Old Campground," and American and Japanese veterans came forward and held hands. Because of their participation in the symposium, "they themselves came to grips with the past," Martinez recalled. "It is too bad we will miss some of those opportunities."
Preble Stolz asked for reactions to the point that commemoration and historical analysis can be combined. "I am skeptical of this concept and think it almost impossible," he declared. "At Pearl Harbor there are two separate places for those concepts." Martinez repeated his early recommendation that the Enola Gay should be displayed somewhere else on the mall as a separate venue site. Crouch then admitted, "I quoted John Dower, saying celebratory tradition and historical analysis could be merged. But having gone through this, I am not so sure, at least in that museum on that occasion."

"You remember that Speaker Gingrich said his whole life was changed when he visited Verdun as a young man," Shy commented. While the name of the place alone is a symbol of the horror of World War I, the museum among the forts and trenches tells the story in a way that "angers and dishonors no one." Perhaps this is because the colors orange and green are used to represent the two sides. "It is painful and hard," Shy acknowledged, "but it is worth doing and I think it can be done. Maybe, if you are going to remember the end of the Second World War, the National Air and Space Museum is not the place to begin and the artifact is not the Enola Gay." Martinez noted that many public historians believe this is true.

"I will take a minority view here," interjected Wolk. "I think it could be done, carefully, deliberately, and with an appropriate review process." Stolz found Martinez's point about confidentiality in the review process "a little glib . . . . The Smithsonian is a public institution. You do not have the power to keep it confidential if others involved want to expose it." Martinez responded, "You bring people in and you stress that confidence. We told them from the beginning that they were part of a team. The confidentiality that occurs is to bring consensus and to make it work. Those involved in the Pearl Harbor project saw an end product would result from the team effort." He noted that there were no legal means to hold people to confidentiality, but successes were the result of a "sense of trust and honor."

Crouch maintained that the worst thing a public institution can do is give even the perception that it is not being completely open and above board. "To some extent," Stolz remarked, "when dealing with such issues you run the risk that people will think that it is to their advantage to expose even though it will damage the product."

**QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS**

Q: (For Crouch) The day's discussions seem to conclude that the Smithsonian was wrong. Do you agree? Did you learn anything?
A: (Crouch) You would have to define "wrong" for me. I have to wonder if the gulf between the notion of commemorating the end of the war and analyzing a turning point in world history—the use of the bomb—was not simply too wide to bridge. The museum did everything, I think, that we possibly could to bridge that gulf, and it was unsuccessful. As for the second part of the question, both the Smithsonian as a whole and the National Air and Space Museum have learned a lot from this that relates to process issues when it comes to doing exhibitions. If they have not all been learned yet, I think we are in the process of learning them, and this is probably part of that.

Q: Is it possible for the academic community to understand and appreciate the experiences of those who fought?
A: (Shy) The historian is charged with understanding all sorts of things where the historian never was or could be. It is retrieving the world before you were a part of it. It is what we do. There is a problem because we do not agree with one another, but that is part of the process of remembering at every level, from the individual to the collective memory that we call history.
Q: How can museums negotiate the diversity of international visitors and be patriotic?
A: (Martinez) At the USS Arizona Memorial, our challenge is to tell our story of Pearl Harbor as honestly and objectively as possible to the two million visitors a year. There is another side of the story that is told in Japan. Many of our Japanese visitors are being exposed to this history for the first time. We have a unique opportunity to help them comprehend how we perceive this story. To accommodate this we have brochures and publications printed in Japanese. In the near future foreign language translation will be available in the theater and on the tour boats to the memorial. This will further solidify the opportunity to explain the Pearl Harbor attack through the eyes of the Americans that experienced it. As baby-boomers, which most present day Americans and Japanese are, we have to come to grips with our parents’ and grandparents’ history and decide the future between our two nations. That is what we inherit.
A: (Shy) Fiftieth anniversaries are especially difficult because the survivors are near the end of their lives. Their youths mean more to them than they did earlier in their lives. It is powerful stuff that works on a fiftieth anniversary. Maybe the Verdun site was built long enough after the event that it did not have the kind of explosiveness that this moment has in American history.

Q: Why was a confidential script sent to the museums in Nagasaki and Hiroshima in the development of the Enola Gay exhibition?
A: (Crouch) Who said the script was confidential? It was not. Dr. Harwitt decided we should talk with museum heads in Japan, because what happened on the ground is part of the story, and to ask if they would lend objects from their collections to use in that unit of the exhibition. The understanding was, as with everyone else, they would have an opportunity to read and comment on the script. We would make up our minds about the comments.

Q: Are controversial exhibitions a symptom of the ideological war being waged between liberals and conservatives?
A: (Wolk) Some of the most important points to be made here are much less pedestrian than that. I think in large measure the exhibition was not mounted because of process and structure.
A: (Shy) I will take the Jeffersonian position that out of this uproar in the marketplace of ideas will come something approaching truth. We will all be forced to think about it, and maybe we will be a little smarter when we end.
A: (Martinez) There are places where controversy will always breed. Understanding that is the key. The process must be careful and considerate. In the development of the scriptwriting process for the film, confidentiality was essential. Once the script was finished, it obviously became public. I do not want to give the impression that the National Park Service operates in some dark closet. It does not. But the key is understanding the hot issues and how to reach consensus. It is essential to the research and development stages of potentially controversial exhibitions.
A: (Crouch) I would not argue with that. At the same time, then, you are dealing with a first draft. The process of review and shaping is part of producing an institutional product.
A: (Martinez) Where things go awry is that the organization that published should have been part of the research and development process.
A: (Crouch) If you mean the Air Force Association, they were part of the process.

Q: Are there issues that do not lend themselves to museum exhibition, as opposed to other treatments?
A: (Crouch) Sure, some subjects are better suited to books than to exhibitions. We had a fourteen-month series of lectures and panel discussions on air power, to test ideas that might show up in the exhibition. The real question is whether this subject is unsuited to an exhibition. I am not sure that is the case. We are dealing with understanding this icon and the messages it carries. Maybe the issues involved here were simply too difficult.
Q: Is it wise to add to the exhibition the policy of unconditional surrender? Is it a question that lends itself to an exhibition discussion as opposed to a discussion in a book?
A: (Crouch) Now you are coming to the nitty-gritty real decisions. Obviously, many people think perhaps we did not make the right decision.
A: (Shy) It is interesting for a historian to try to reconstruct the very human, bureaucratic decision-making process. The National Air and Space Museum script did a little of this regarding the Potsdam conference. You could do an interesting television documentary on this, but maybe not an exhibition in a museum. Kids would not like it.
A: (Martinez) I am not sure the seminar system is the barometer for reading how an exhibition will be received. The audiences who attend seminars are not generally the individuals on summer vacation or the veterans’ groups that attend our national museums. The question of who the audience is and what they expect is critical to the success or failure of an exhibition at a national museum.
A: (Crouch) I was speaking about ways to involve people who have a special interest in your institution and how it does business. We work hard to understand our audience in terms of the people who come through the front door.

Q: The Smithsonian is a remarkable and unique institution. Many think of the Air and Space Museum as a shrine to American technology. Does the Enola Gay belong in the company of the Wright Flyer and the Apollo capsule? It was historically an important vehicle for an extraordinary event, but as an airplane, it was not particularly significant.
A: (Wolk) The B-29 was an extraordinary airplane in the sense of technology. It was a great advance over the B-17 and the B-24.
A: (Crouch) Not only is that true, but the Enola Gay represents a moment in time that is a turning point in the same way the Wright Flyer was. We may be less comfortable with it, but it is tough to argue it is not as important. It is interesting, though, that during the hearings relating to the new Air and Space Museum building, Senator Barry Goldwater mentioned the Enola Gay as a plane he would not call genuinely historic.
A: (Shy) The section in the original script on the development of the B-29 was fascinating. I count myself a military historian, and I had no idea of the pace at which it was done, the places it was built, the lethal problems encountered in getting it to fly, and that it was a difficult airplane to fly even when it was operational. This is gone from the present exhibit, and I think that is a great loss.
A: (Martinez) The veterans who visit where I work look at that airplane far differently than you have described it. The Arizona is an icon they pay respect to. The Enola Gay is special. They saw something in it that they had not seen in the years of hard fighting in the Pacific. That was hope and the end of the war. The Enola Gay continues to symbolize that to the veterans. That is why we had such a large reaction to it, because to them it was a symbol of American technology, accomplishment, and bringing the war to an end.
A: That is the B-29, not the Enola Gay.
A: (Martinez) I do not see any difference, and I do not think the veterans do either.
A: (Crouch) Again, the airplane is an icon and the images, thoughts, and feelings attached to it are enormously complex. They run the gamut. They really do.